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DECLARATION AGAINST PENAL INTEREST RECOGNIZED
AS EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE
People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 242 N.W.2d 739 (1976)
In People v. Edwards,' the Michigan Supreme Court adopted a
declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule because
such out-of-court statements were inherently trustworthy.
The defendant Edwards, on trial for murder, repudiated his prior
confession of guilt,2 presented an alibi,3 and attempted to introduce testi-
mony that one Chester Blake, since deceased, admitted to a defense wit-
ness that he, not Edwards, was the murderer.4 The trial judge excluded
this testimony because it violated the hearsay rule,' and the defendant
was convicted of second degree murder.' The appellate court affirmed,'
but the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and held: An out-of-court
statement by a declarant, since deceased, made against his penal in-
terest was inherently trustworthy and admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule."
In the American criminal justice system, few rights are more funda-
mental than that of the accused to present witnesses in his own defense.'
But in the exercise of this right, the accused must comply with the rules
of procedure and evidence10 established to ensure the fair and reliable"l
1. 396 Mich. 551, 242 N.W.2d 739 (1976).
2. id. at 554 n.4, 242 N.W.2d at 740 n.4.
3. Id. at 554, 242 N.W.2d at 740.
4. Id. at 555, 242 N.W.2d at 740.
5. Id. at 553, 242 N.W.2d at 739.
6. Id. at 552-53, 242 N.W.2d at 739.
7. 47 Mich. App. 307, 209 N.W.2d 527 (1973), rev'd, 396 Mich. 551, 242 N.W.2d
739 (1976).
8. 396 Mich. 551, 566-67, 242 N.W.2d 739, 746 (1976).
9. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (denial of due process when-
ever inflexible evidence rules bar admission of critical exculpatory third-party declara-
tions of criminal responsibility); see, e.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (denial
of due process where judge threatens sole defense witness until he refuses to testify);,
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (denial of due process where state law bars
coparticipant in same crime from testifying for defense); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) (denial of due process where person is summarily convicted of perjury before
grand jury without opportunity to offer any defense).
10. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
11. Id. See People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 874, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36 Cal. Rptr.
841, 845 (1964) (evidence rules must facilitate, rather than hinder, the search for
truth); People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 179, 108 N.E.2d 488, 492 (1952) (hearsay rule
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determination of guilt or innocence. The exclusion of hearsay evidence,
out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted,' 2 is one of the most widely recognized of these rules.' 3 Its pur-
pose is to exclude evidence, the credibility of which cannot be tested
by the traditional courtroom devices: testimony given under oath,' 4
the personal presence and demeanor of the witness,'3 and cross-exam-
ination.'6 Rigid application of the hearsay rule, however, would often
result in the exclusion of highly probative and reliable evidence. Courts,
therefore, have created numerous exceptions to admit hearsay evidence
when the declarant is unavailable to testify and there is a circumstantial
probability of its trustworthiness.' 7 Declarations against pecuniary and
proprietary interest qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule on the
theory that a person is unlikely to fabricate declarations contrary to
should apply "except in cases where justice demands a departure"). See also Ansel,
Constitutional Law-Evidence, 62 ILL. B.J. 158 (1973) (hearsay rule application must
-not only be consistent and predictable, but also flexible to meet due process require-
ments).
12. See Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 664 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. de-
nied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965); People v. Lee, 391 Mich. 618, 642, 218 N.W.2d 655, 666
(1974); In re Earle, 355 Mich. 596, 602, 95 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1959); People v. Fell,
65 Mich. App. 543, 549, 237 N.W.2d 550, 552 (1975); People v. Jones, 48 Mich. App.
102, 106, 210 N.W.2d 145, 148 (1973); FED. R. EVID. 801, 802; N.J.R. EVD. 63. See
also C. MCCORimCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 245-46 (2d ed. 1972); 2
F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 265 (13th ed. 1972); 5 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §
1361 (rev. ed. Chadboum 1974).
13. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973); C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 12 § 246; 5 1. WM RE, supra note 12 § 1361; 29 AM. Ju. 2D Evidence § 493
(1967).
14. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (an oath impresses upon the
declarant the solemnity of his declaration); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,
273 (1913); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 743, 117 S.E. 843, 847 (1923); see
C. McCoRMcK, supra note 12 § 245, at 582; 5 J. WiGMORE, supra note 12 § 1362, at
7; Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 271 (1952).
15. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12 § 245, 253; Note, Appropriate Foundation Re-
quirements for Admitting Computer Printouts into Evidence, 1977 WAsH. UL.Q. 59,
64-65.
16. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (cross-examination tests the
truth of declarant's statements and allows the jury to assess his demeanor and credibil-
.ity); accord, Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913); People v. Chambers,
279 Mich. 73, 78, 271 N.W. 556, 558 (1937); People v. Fell, 65 Mich. App. 543, 549,
237 N.W.2d 550, 552 (1975); People v. Rea, 38 Mich. App. 141, 142, 195 N.W.2d 809,
810 (1972); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 743, 117 S.E. 843, 847 (1923); see
C. McCoRmcK, supra note 12 § 245, at 583-84; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12 § 1362, at
3. See also Ladd, supra note 14, at 272; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 188 (1948); Tribe, Triangulating Hear-
say, 87 HAv. L. REv. 957, 968 (1974).
17. 5 3. WiMoRE, supra note 12 § 1455, at 323.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/7
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his economic interest.'3 Until recently, courts have been unwilling to
extend this theory to declarations against penal interest.19
As early as 1844, English courts distinguished declarations against
pecuniary and proprietary interest from declarations against penal
interest.20 These courts emphasized that statements which subject the
declarant only to criminal liability and loss of liberty are not sufficiently
trustworthy to be admissible at trial.2 Although most American
courts adopted this distinction22 with little attention to the underlying
rationale,23 several courts justified the exclusion of hearsay declarations
18. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973); Donnelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913); Dieke v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 3 Ariz. App.
430, 432, 415 P.2d 145, 147 (1966); People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 874, 389 P.2d
377, 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845 (1964); State v. Leong, 51 Haw. 581, 587, 465 P.2d
560, 564 (1970); Alexander v. State, 84 Nev. 737, 741, 449 P.2d 153, 155 (1968); Rau
v. First Nat'l Stores, 97 N.H. 490, 493, 92 A.2d 921, 923 (1952); State v. Sejuelas, 94
N.J. Super. 576, 581, 229 A.2d 659, 661 (App. Div. 1961); Hines v. Commonwealth,
136 Va. 728, 741, 117 S.E. 843, 846 (1923); Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034,
1045 (1844); FED. R. EvmD. 804(a)(3) (1975); N.J.R. Evm. 63(10); 5 J. WIG ORE,
supra note 12 § 1457, at 329; MODEL CODE OF EVImENCE rule 509(1) (1942).
19. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 12 § 278; Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest:
An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3943 (1944). Several jurisdic-
tions, however, have recognized declarations against social interests as exceptions to the
hearsay rule in their statutory rules of evidence. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (Deer-
ing 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(j) (Vernon 1964); NEv. REV. STAT. § 51.315
(1971); FED. R. Evw. 804(a)(3) (1975); N.J.R. Evm. 63(10); UTAH R. Evm. 63(10).
See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509(1) (1942); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
63(10); C. McCoIumncK, supra note 12 § 278, at 675; Jefferson, supra at 39-43 (equating
penal interests and social interests under the hearsay rules).
Uniform Rule 63(10) defines declarations against social interests as those declarations
which make the declarant "the object of hatred, ridicule, or social disapproval in the
community."
20. E.g., Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1045-46 (1844).
21. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1973) ("confessions
of criminal activity are often motivated by extraneous considerations"); Brown v. State,
99 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911) (unavailable declarant may have been motivated by
desire to free his brother, the accused, rather than by compulsion of guilt). See also
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913); Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265,
271, 134 A. 148, 150 (1926); State v. Johnson, 60 Wis. 2d 334, 340, 210 N.W.2d 735,
738 (1973); Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1045-46 (1844) (these courts were
concerned with declarant's motivation in making declaration against interest).
22. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913); People v. Spriggs, 60
Cal. 2d 868, 870, 389 P.2d 377, 378, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 842 (1964); Hines v. Common-
wealth, 136 Va. 728, 743, 117 S.E. 843, 847 (1923); C. McCoM-icK, supra note 12
§ 278; 5 1. WIGMORE, supra note 12 § 1476.
23. E.g., State v. Larson, 91 Idaho 42, 49, 415 P.2d 685, 691 (1966); People v. Lett-
rich, 413 Ill. 172, 178, 108 N.E.2d 488, 491-92 (1952); People v. Sartori, 168 Mich.
308, 317, 134 N.W. 200, 203 (1912). See Annot., 162 A.L.R. 446, 447 n.5 (1946).
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against penal interest by noting that the likelihood of collusion be-
tween declarant and defendant was greater in the case of statements
against penal interest.24
More recently, an increasing number of commentators and courts
have vigorously criticized the English rule,2" claiming that declarations
against penal interest are as inherently trustworthy as those against
pecuniary and proprietary interest.26 Initially, many courts maintained
that a person was unlikely to fabricate statements against his penal
interest and thereby subject himself to possible criminal conviction,
imprisonment, and especially economic loss. 27 Other courts have begun
The general rule of law for exculpatory declarations against penal interest is succinctly
stated in 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 749, at 1115 (1961) as follows:
The extrajudicial declarations of a person other than accused, confessing or
tending to show that he committed the crime, are generally held not to be
competent for accused, for, although the latter may exculpate himself by prov-
ing, if he can, that someone with whom he was not connected committed the
crime with which he is charged, he cannot do so by hearsay.
24. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 301 n.21 (1973) (example of
hypothetical scheme between accused and declarant); State v. Larson, 91 Idaho 42, 49,
415 P.2d 685, 692 (1966) (temptation for accused to produce false confessions by un-
available declarants); State v. Gervals, 317 A.2d 796, 802-03 (Me. 1974); Brennan v.
State, 151 Md. 265, 271, 134 A. 148, 150 (1926); State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 298-
300, 159 S.E. 318, 319-20 (1931); Davis v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 515, 521-22, 128 P.
1097, 1099 (1913). See also 5 J. WIoMORE, supra note 12 § 1477, at 358-59; REPORT
OF TnE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITrEE ON EVIDENCE, Rule 63(10), Com-
ment at 717 (1963).
25. See, e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 870, 389 P.2d 377, 378, 36 Cal. Rptr.
841, 842 (1964); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 295-97, 189 S.W.2d 284, 289-90
(1945); Alexander v. State, 84 Nev. 737, 743, 449 P.2d 153, 157 (1968) (Thompson,
J., dissenting); People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 92, 257 N.E.2d 16, 17-18, 308 N.Y.S.2d
825, 827-28 (1970); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 743-44, 117 S.E. 843, 847
(1923); C. MCCoRMIcK, supra note 12 § 278; 5 J. WiGMoRE, supra note 12 §§ 1476.
77; Wack, Evidence-Admissibility of Dying Declarations, 28 J. CluM. L.C. & P.S. 760
(1938); Note, 21 MINN. L. REv. 181 (1936); Note, 11 U. KAN. L. REv. 275 (1962);
Comment, 16 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 126 (1959).
26. E.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 874-75, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36 Cal. Rptr.
841, 845 (1964) (penal interest could implicate pecuniary interest because conviction
of a crime usually entails economic loss); accord, State v. Leong, 51 Haw. 581, 588,
465 P.2d 560, 564 (1970); People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 92, 257 N.E.2d 16, 18, 308
N.Y.S.2d 825, 828 (1970). See also Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 175 Iowa 358,
393-94, 151 N.W. 852, 864 (1915) (declaration against penal interest accepted as trust-
worthy where crime admitted was a tort, subjecting declarant to civil liability for dam-
ages); G.M. McKelvey Co. v. General Cas. Co., 166 Ohio St. 401, 405, 142 N.E.2d
854, 856-57 (1957); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch, 179 Okla. 617, 619-20, 67 P.2d 452,
455 (1937).
27. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 874-75, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841,
845 (1964) (criminal conviction causes loss of wages, thus declaration is also against
economic interest); Weber v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 383, 394, 151 N.W.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/7
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to recognize that a declarant's interest in avoiding criminal prosecution
alone is sufficient to ensure "the veracity of his statement made against
that interest."2
Focusing on the likelihood of collusion and fabricated testimony by
in-court defense witnesses, a number of courts have been willing to
recognize the exception only in special circumstances that diminish
the probability of fraud. Thus, if the prosecution's case is based solely
on circumstantial evidence,29 if the defense offers admissible evidence
corroborating the hearsay declaration, 30 or if the defense proves that
the declarant had personal knowledge of the crime,3' the declaration
against penal interest may be admissible. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence adopted this hybrid approach, requiring corroborating evidence
to ensure the reliability of the defense witness' testimony about the out-
of-court statement.32 This limited exception may be constitutionally
852, 861, 864 (1915) (criminal conviction exposes declarant to civil liability and conse-
quent economic loss); G.M. McKelvey Co. v. General Cas. Co., 166 Ohio St. 401, 405,
142 N.E.2d 854, 856 (1957) (confession of embezzlement renders declarant civilly liable
for return of money taken); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch, 179 Okla. 617, 620, 67 P.2d
452, 455 (1937) (confession of murder precluded declarant from collecting life insur-
ance proceeds and rendered him civilly liable).
28. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 874, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841,
845 (1964); Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 273, 134 A. 148, 151 (1926); Osborne v.
Purdome, 250 S.W.2d 159, 163 (Mo. 1952); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 295-96,
189 S.W.2d 284, 289-90 (1945); People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 94, 257 N.E.2d 16,
19, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 829 (1970); Commonwealth v. Nash, 457 Pa. 296, 302, 324 A.2d
344, 346 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(j) (Vernon 1964); N.J.R. EVI. 63(10);
UTAH R. EviD. 63(10). For an excellent discussion of the rationale behind finding dec-
larations against penal interest trustworthy, see Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. at 295-
96, 189 S.W.2d at 289-90.
29. Cammeron v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 29, 31, 217 S.W.2d 23, 24 (1949); Hines
v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 740, 117 S.E. 843, 848 (1923); Jefferson, supra note
19, at 41-43.
30. People v. Fletcher, 546 P.2d 980, 985-86 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Lar-
son, 91 Idaho 42, 49, 415 P.2d 685, 692 (1966); People v. Craven, 54 Il1.2d 419, 429,
299 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1973); State v. Higgenbotham, 298 Minn. 1, 4, 212 N.W.2d 881, 883
(1973); State v. Gorden, 356 Mo. 1010, 1014, 204 S.W.2d 713, 715 (1947); Blocker
v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 30, 33, 114 S.W. 814, 815 (1908); State v. Gardner, 13 Wash.
App. 194, 199, 534 P.2d 140, 142 (1975); Wis. STAT. § 908.045(4) (Cum. Supp.
1977-78). See also Commonwealth v. Nash, 457 Pa. 296, 302-03, 324 A.2d 344, 346-47
(1974); NEv. REV. STAT. § 51.315(l)(a) (1973); Prince, Policy Considerations and
Changes in the Hearsay Rules: A Comment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 761, 769 (1975).
31. State v. Leong, 51 Haw. 581, 587, 465 P.2d 560, 564 (1970); People v. Riccardi,
73 Misc. 2d 19, 22, 340 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 40 App. Div. 1083, 338
N.Y.S.2d 598 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973); CAL. EVil. CODE § 1230
(Deering 1966).
32. FED. R. EviD. 804(a) (3).Washington University Open Scholarship
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required. The Supreme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi,, held that
the defendant's due process right to a fair trial compelled the admission
of such out-of-court declarations when the evidence was crucial to the
defendant's case and there was a substantial guarantee of its trust-
worthiness. 4
Prior to Edwards, Michigan courts adhered to the English rule38 and
excluded third party confessions regardless of whether they were sup-
ported by corroborative evidence. 6
The Edwards court reviewed the history of the exclusionary rule for
declarations against penal interest and concluded that courts excluded
them not because they believed that such statements were inherently
untrustworthy, but because they feared that in-court witnesses would
fabricate such statements to establish the defendant's innocence. 7 The
court noted, however, that a defense witness testifying to a hearsay con-
fession was no more likely to commit perjury than a defendant testifying
to an alibi and thus his testimony should not be excluded.3 8  Tra-
ditional courtroom devices of testimony under oath, cross-examination,
and the threat of prosecution could solve the problem of perjured testi-
mony. In view of these safeguards, the jury is capable of determining
the weight to be given this evidence.39 For these reasons, the Michigan
court rejected any qualifications on the admission of declarations
against penal interest, adopting instead a broad exception to the hearsay
rule.40 By placing its holding on common law grounds, the court did
not consider the circumstances under which the admission of declarations
against penal interest might be constitutionally required by due process. 41
The dissent, adopting the hybrid approach of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,42 argued that declarations against penal interest should be ad-
missible only if the declarant is unavailable and there is a circumstantial
33. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
34. Id. at 302-03; Commonwealth v. Nash, 457 Pa. 296, 302, 324 A.2d 344, 346
(1974); see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80-83 (1970) (allowed admission of cocon-
spirator's out-of-court declaration made during concealment phase of conspiracy without
regard to his availability). See also Krey, Chambers v. Mississippi: Due Process and
the Rules of Evidence, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 725, 734-35 (1974).
35. People v. Edwards, 47 Mich. App. 307, 309-10, 209 N.W.2d 527, 528 (1973),
rev'd, 396 Mich. 551, 242 N.W.2d 739 (1976).
36. People v. Sartori, 168 Mich. 308, 134 N.W. 200 (1912).
37. 396 Mich. 551, 561, 242 N.W.2d 739, 744 (1976).
38. Id. at 564-65, 242 N.W.2d at 744-45.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 566, 242 N.W.2d at 745-46.
41. Id. at 567, 242 N.W.2d at 746-47.
42. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1977:349
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probability of trustworthiness.43 In Edwards, there was insufficient
corroborative evidence. 4
There are two potential limitations on the court's holding: First, be-
cause the third-party declarant was dead, not simply unavailable, the
court did not consider whether the confession of a third party who merely
fled from the jurisdiction would be sufficiently against his interest to
come within the exception. In addition, the court noted parenthetically
that other evidence admissible at trial tended to corroborate the third-
party declaration. 6 It did not discuss the importance of this evidence
to its holding.
The Michigan Supreme Court's adoption of an unqualified exception
to the hearsay rule for declarations against penal interest is commend-
able. A defendant is entitled to present his best defense to the trier of
fact, and the adoption of this hearsay exception facilitates that goal.
Surely when a defendant is on trial for his life, principles of justice
and equity demand the admission of third-party confessions against the
declarant's penal interest that tend to establish the defendant's inno-
cence as well as the statements against the declarant's proprietary or
pecuniary interest.47 The United States Supreme Court has suggested
that, under certain circumstances, due process requires no less. 8
Although the court's result is admirable, its reasoning is less so.
By focusing on the judicial fear of perjured in-court testimony and
concluding that the oath, cross-examination, and threat of prosecution
43. Id. at 568, 242 N.W.2d at 748.
44. Id.
45. Compare Deike v. Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 3 Ariz. App. 430, 432, 415 P.2d
145, 147 (1966), with People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 875, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36
Cal. Rptr. 841, 845 (1964), and FED. R. Evm. 803, 804, and C. MCCORMIcK, supra note
12 § 253, and 5 J. WI GMORE, supra note 12 § 1456, and 29 Aw. Jun. 2D Evidence §
618 (1967).
46. 396 Mich. 551, 567, 242 N.W.2d 739, 746 (1976).
47. Justice Roberts, concurring in Commonwealth v. Nash, 457 Pa. 296, 324 A.2d
344 (1974), noted:
A statement that subjected the declarant to possible criminal sanctions could
hardly be considered anything but against interest. The limitation of the ex-
ception to declarations against pecuniary and proprietary interests is grounded
in the belief that they are less likely to be motivated by extraneous considera-
tions and provide less inducement to perjury. This reasoning is unsound.
If the object of the present lawsuit were a $100,000,000 judgment, can one
doubt that there would be any less incentive to swear falsely?
Id. at 308, 324 A.2d at 349.
48. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
Number 2] 355
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provide sufficient safeguards to allow the admission of declarations
against penal interest,49 the court failed to discuss the crucial prelimi-
nary questions of whether and why these statements are as trustworthy
and therefore as admissible as declarations against pecuniary and
proprietary interest.5° Implicitly, the court held that a person who risks
his liberty and subjects himself to criminal liability by making an out-
of-court confession is just as likely to tell the truth as a person who
makes statements contrary to his economic interest. The trustworthi-
ness of the confession is ensured equally whether one risks his economic
interest or his liberty. Unfortunately, the court did not make this
equation explicit and thereby escaped the necessity of explaining its
holding and distinguishing those jurisdictions that declined to equate
declarations against penal interest with declarations against pecuniary
and proprietory interest.51
The court's focus on the fear of perjured testimony by defense wit-
nesses also enabled it to avoid a discussion of the possible limitations
on its holding. For example, the unavailable declarant was dead and
there was independent evidence tending to corroborate his confession.
The Edwards opinion did not consider the importance of these factors
in ensuring the inherent trustworthiness of the statement because the
court was primarily concerned with the possibility of perjury by the
in-court witness. Nevertheless, the court's implicit holding that declara-
tions against nonpecuniary interests are inherently trustworthy is likely
to hasten its admission in the future of declarations against social in-
terest.52 The same noneconomic interests in life, liberty, and honor
which underlie the penal interest exception, and seem to ensure its
inherent trustworthiness, underlie the social interest exception as well;
a declarant risks the hatred, ridicule, and social disapproval of his com-
munity when he confesses against his social interest." The Michigan
Supreme Court would have anticipated and addressed such implications
if it had focused on the trustworthiness of the out-of-court declarant as
well as the likelihood of fabricated testimony by defense witnesses.
49. See Notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
50. See Notes 20-28 supra and accompanying text.
51. See Notes 20-36 supra and accompanying text.
52. United States v. Dovico, 261 F. Supp. 862, 871-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380
F.2d 325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967); State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599,
609-10, 64 P. 1014, 1017-18 (1901); Fine, Declarations Against Penal Interest in Newp
York Carte Blanche?, 21 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 1095, 1107-09 (1970); Morgan, Declara-
tion Against Interest, 5 VAND L, REv. 451, 475 (1952).
53. See Jefferson, supra note 19, at 39-40.
[Vol. 1977:349
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